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Abstract 
Explanations of poverty, growth and development more generally depend on the 
assumptions made about individual preferences and the willingness to engage in 
strategic behaviour. Economic experiments, especially those conducted in the 
field, have begun to paint a picture of economic agents in developing 
communities that is at some variance from the traditional portrait. We review 
this growing literature with an eye towards preference-related experiments 
conducted in the field. We rely on these studies, in addition to our own 
experiences in the field, to offer lessons on what development economists might 
learn from experiments. We conclude by sharing our thoughts on how to conduct 
experiments in the field, and then offer a few ideas for future research. 
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date. 1. Introduction 
Experimental economics offers methods to test many behavioural hypotheses at 
the core of why, after decades of attempts to induce development with 
interventions through markets, the state, and self-governance, a few countries 
have escaped poverty while others remain desperately poor. These issues now 
influence the mainstream of development economics (Ray, 1998; Bardhan and 
Udry, 1999; Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001) and behavioural experiments have begun to 
demonstrate the importance of testing (and perhaps replacing) the standard 
assumptions made about decision-makers. Inspired by our own experiences and 
those of a growing number of researchers, we highlight some of the lessons that 
can be learned from conducting behavioural experiments in developing 
communities. To discipline our review, we focus on a topic that has always been 
at the heart of development economics – individual preferences.  We look for 
insights in four categories of experiments: those measuring the propensity to 
cooperate in social dilemmas, those measuring trust and reciprocity, those 
measuring norms of fairness and altruism and those designed to elicit risk and 
time preferences. 
Without state support, many developing communities rely on local norms 
and rules of conduct to provide public goods and regulate extraction from 
common pool resources. Both of these situations can be categorized as social 
dilemmas in which individual incentives are at odds with group incentives. For 
example, egoistic individuals should free-ride on the contributions to public goods 
made by others but the community as a whole does better when everyone 
contributes. The obvious question is whether the individuals making these 
decisions are egoistic and the more subtle question is whether egoism is acquired 
– in other words do egoism and institutions co-evolve? Our review uncovers a 
considerable amount of cooperation among people in developing communities; 
however, there is variation and although egoists are not the dominant type, they 
do exist. One of the most important lessons from this research might be that 
cooperative predispositions are heterogeneous and theory needs to account for 
this fact. 
2Much of the recent interest in social capital is motivated by the ability of 
norms of trust and reciprocity to substitute for formal institutions and complete 
otherwise incomplete contracts. Communities rich in trust and reciprocity are 
thought to be more productive because the stock of these norms allows people to 
engage in relationships that would not be profitable if people were not 
reciprocally-minded. An initial response to this hypothesis was to correlate the 
performance of countries with surveyed measures of trust and reciprocity (e.g., 
Knack and Keefer, 1997). Experiments are now available that allow one to 
measure these norms more precisely. Our survey of the results of such 
experiments suggests that the variation in experimental measures of trust and 
reciprocity continues to correlate with important economic indicators like the 
growth rate of GDP, the fraction of the population in poverty, the rate of 
unemployment and the Gini coefficient. 
Developing communities must often adjudicate disputes locally. An 
interesting question is whether the norms of fairness and altruism that evolve to 
fill this void vary in some systematic way with, for example, the dominant 
production technology (e.g., individual versus team production) and whether this 
variation correlates more generally with the economic performance of the 
communities. We review the distribution experiments conducted in developing 
communities and again find substantial variation in the norms that evolve and 
the extent to which these norms appear to be stable. In many, but not all, cases 
the allocations that tend to be punished as unfair are precisely those allocations 
that people on the other side of the interaction tend to avoid. 
The remaining experiments that we consider have been constructed to 
elicit risk and time preferences. This sort of experiment actually has a long 
tradition in the development literature (starting with Binswanger, 1980) and has 
been largely motivated by the proposition that impatience and risk aversion 
might explain why poor people remain poor. Our reading of the experimental 
literature suggests that this proposition might not be very accurate. We find 
little evidence that poor people in developing countries are more risk averse than 
people in the developed world; however, the impatience results are mixed. 
3Section two is the heart of our review because we describe the preference 
experiments that are now common in the field and we highlight the important 
results that might inform the direction of new research on economic development. 
We are more critical in section three where we point to a few methodological 
problems with the current literature. In section three we also offer advice on how 
to run experiments in the field. We conclude our review in section four with ideas 
on how to push the frontier of preference research in developing communities. 
2. Preference Experiments Conducted in Developing Communities 
In this section we briefly describe the standard experimental protocols used to 
elicit preferences in the field, we describe any universal patterns that we see in 
the data, and, most importantly, we list the lessons that we think might motivate 
development economists. Tables 1 through 5 contain summary statistics from 
many of the experiments that we have discovered. 
2.1 The Propensity to Cooperate in Social Dilemmas 
There has now been a considerable amount of research on the cooperativeness of 
individuals in developing countries. Three experiments are used in this context: 
the prisoner’s dilemma, the voluntary contribution mechanism, and the common 
pool resource game. Each game sets up a social dilemma for the participants in 
which one strategy leads to the social optimum while the dominant strategy (or 
best response function) leads to a socially inefficient outcome. The prisoner’s 
dilemma (PD) is typically conducted as a symmetric two-person game with two 
strategies: cooperate and defect, where defect strictly dominates cooperate. PD 
players are often presented with a normal form matrix in which the payoffs are 
measured in the local currency and asked to choose simultaneously whether to 
cooperate or defect. However, because matrices tend to be formidable for non­
students, the game has also been played in the form of a vignette. The voluntary 
contribution mechanism (VCM) allows players to contribute to a public good, 
despite the dominant strategy of free-riding on the contributions of others, and in 
this way has the incentive structure of an n-person prisoners’ dilemma. This 
4game is often repeated for a number of rounds and at the beginning of each 
round participants are given an endowment of tokens that they can place in two 
accounts: a private account that only benefits the decision-maker and a public 
account that benefits everyone in the group. The amount contributed to the 
public account is a measure of the cooperativeness of the participant. Lastly, in 
the common pool resource game (CPR) players cooperate by not extracting too 
much from a resource that is accessible to all players but rival or subtractible 
(i.e., one player’s extraction reduces the resources available for others to extract). 
Because this game usually has the flavour of a non-linear public bad, explaining 
the payoff function usually does not help participants. Instead, they are presented 
with a table which relates their extraction choice to the aggregate choice of the 
rest of the group. In principle, based on this table participants can identify their 
best response to any extraction level taken by the rest of the group. 
Despite the predictions of many common theories, only a minority of 
people free-ride as a first impulse. Indeed, as one can see in Table 1, 
approximately one-third of players cooperate in the PD, contributions of half the 
endowment are common in the VCM and extracting only three-quarters of the 
Nash level appears to be the norm in the CPR game. However, there is 
considerable variation in play and it would be interesting to assess how well 
behaviour correlates with development. College-aged participants in the United 
States show only moderate rates of cooperation that tend to decline in repeated 
version of the VCM, while cooperation rates are higher and sustained among poor 
participants in Africa and Southeast Asia. This might suggest an inverse 
relationship between norms of cooperation and development. Perhaps formal 
institutions crowd out or take the place of norms; however, the pattern is not 
perfect. For example, cooperation among poor slash and burn horticulturalists in 
Peru is quite low. At the same time, these people, and their relatively 
uncooperative neighbours in Chile, do live extremely remotely which suggests 
that, controlling for the frequency of interactions with strangers (see Henrich, 
2000) there may be some relationship between development and the evolution of 
cooperative norms.
1 
5What other regularities can one see in Table 1? At first blush, it appears 
that students are less cooperative, on average, than other participants. However, 
the difference may really be driven by age and not schooling. Looking only at 
non-students, List (2004) finds that older people are more cooperative in the 
United States, as do Gaechter et al., (2004) in Russia and Carpenter et al., 
(2004b) in Southeast Asia.  Allowing participants to socially sanction free-riders 
also appears to have a noticeable effect on contributions. There is some variation 
in the sanctioning technology, but in all three cases (Barr, 2001; Carpenter, et al., 
2004a), cooperation increases when social sanctions are allowed.
2  In the CPR 
game, simply allowing participants to discuss the game between rounds has an 
effect similar to social sanctions. For example, Cardenas et al., (2002) show that 
discussion between rounds of the experiment can reduce extraction dramatically, 
the effect is lasting, and simple discussion leads to conservation levels that are 
better than when imperfect external regulation is imposed. The effect of simple 
communication also seems to have some external validity. Carpenter et al., 
(2004b) regress contribution levels in a VCM on surveyed measures of how often 
participants have informal conversations with their neighbours and find that 
more chatty Vietnamese participants were also more cooperative. 
The Ashraf (2005) experiment complements the monitoring and 
punishment studies. In this experiment, married couples of Filipinos are asked to 
make family saving decisions. The gist of the experiment is that people are 
allocated money and have to decide to either deposit it in an account that only 
the decision-maker can benefit from or in one that benefits the entire family – 
another social dilemma. Interestingly, the revelation of information about what 
participants have done only matters for men. When their wives can find out what 
they have done, men allocate as much money to the family as women do, but 
when they can hide their choices, men are likely to keep more. These results 
suggest that models of household bargaining are incomplete and although these 
results are surely culturally specific, they do provide a strong lesson about 
targeting policy in the Philippines. Cash transfers and grants, intended to benefit 
children, for example, should either be given directly to mothers or if this is 
6cumbersome to implement, they must be given so that it is obvious that mothers 
know when the family has been given money. 
As hinted at above, one very important lesson that is starting to emerge 
from the collection of these cooperation experiments is that there seems to be a 
relationship between the existence of formal institutions and the form of norms 
and social preferences that dictate behaviour. Although the relationship is far 
from being “pinned down,” it appears that societies in which formal institutions 
are missing or weak develop and rely on pro-social norms and preferences as 
behavioural benchmarks more than other societies in which institutions are 
strong. This obviously makes sense: I don’t need to feel very cooperative towards 
you if we can write an enforceable contract, but when we cannot, then you 
demonstrating your cooperativeness matters a lot. If informal enforcement 
mechanisms are provided locally and cooperation is enforced by social ostracism 
or mutual monitoring, cooperation may be sustainable. 
At this stage, the few observations of the interaction between institutions 
and cooperation suggest more questions than they resolves. For example, while 
Cardenas et al., (2000) and Carpenter and Seki (2005) provide some evidence 
that formal institutions can crowd out social preferences, the dynamics and, in 
particular, the process of coevolution is not understood very well. Given the 
possible endogeneity of norms and preferences, there may also be somewhat of a 
stability-performance trade-off. There is now plenty of evidence (e.g., Ostrom, 
1990) suggesting that informal institutions may outperform formal institutions 
because local solutions are often better informed, but if local norms and rules are 
less stable than enforced laws, it is not obvious which path a community should 
follow. 
Other, more concrete, lessons can also be learned from cooperation field 
experiments.  First, the cross-national results on the relationship between age and 
cooperativeness have implications for fostering collective action, volunteering, and 
perhaps fund-raising. Second, the strong results on communication and social 
sanctioning should inform the design of institutions. As the data from Barr (2001) 
suggest, social shaming can have a big effect on behaviour. If one thinks of 
7microcredit as a form of social dilemma, then the success of group lending is not 
so surprising given these results. 
In addition to communication within the group, group composition, itself, 
appears to be an important predictor of cooperation. For example, Cardenas 
(2003a) shows how the mixture of participant economic classes affects play in a 
CPR game. Interestingly, groups composed of mostly poor people actually 
conserve common property better than groups which are mixed between poor 
people and more affluent local property owners. This evidence is obviously 
contrary to Olson’s (1965) privileged group hypothesis. Likewise, Cardenas and 
Carpenter (2004) show that mixed groups of students from different countries in 
a CPR game perform noticeably worse than homogenous groups and that these 
differences are partially explained by conservation attitudes. 
At a more basic level, Carpenter et al., (2004a) show how even the gender 
composition of groups affects the level of cooperation among slum dwelling 
participants in the VCM and this effect appears to depend on location. In 
Vietnam homogeneous groups of women are more cooperative, but in Thailand it 
is the men that are more cooperative. If the effects of asymmetries that we 
document in experiments are externally valid, then policies that seem obvious 
may actually back-fire. For example, extrapolating from Cardenas (2003a), 
policies that increase the market value of labour for those people who extract 
from real CPRs may actually lead to worse management. Instead of relying less 
on extraction from CPR and therefore extracting less, people may just place less 
value on preserving the resource. 
2.2 Trust and Reciprocity 
In the Berg et al., (1995) investment or trust game (TG), two players are 
endowed with money as a show-up fee (typically around ten dollars). The first-
mover is given the chance to send as much of her endowment to an anonymous 
second-mover as she wishes. The experimenter triples the amount of money sent 
so that sending money is socially efficient. The second-mover then sends back as 
much he wishes.
3 
8The subgame perfect prediction is straight-forward.  The second-mover has 
no incentive to send any money back and therefore, realizing this, the first-mover 
should not invest anything in the partnership. Despite this prediction, Table 2 
shows that Berg et al., (1995) find that first-movers send 50% of their 
endowment and second-movers return 30% of what they receive, on average. 
Despite deviating from theory in a prosocial direction, sending money is still a 
bad investment for first-movers because they tend to recover only 90% of what 
they send. In a replication at an institution with a significantly smaller and more 
homogenous student population, however, Burks et al., (2003) find that investing 
pays off (31% return, on average). 
Figure 1 and Table 2 summarize our survey of TG behaviour. The first 
two letters in Figure 1 indicate the country in which the experiment was 
conducted and the name in parentheses indicates the first author of the study. In 
general, we see that, as with the cooperation experiments, average play is 
nowhere near the prediction based on egoistic preferences and there is an upward 
sloping relationship between trust and reciprocity suggesting the possibility of 
multiple trust-trustworthiness equilibria. At one extreme, the South African 
students in the Ashraf et al., (2005a) study do not send very much as the first-
mover and return significantly less than what is sent to them as second-movers. 
Near the other extreme, Tanzanian non-students in the Danielson and Holm 
(2003) study tend to send more than half of their endowments and send back a 
return of 40%, on average. 
The norms that communities settle on also differ in efficiency. Greig and 
Bohnet (2005) for example show that the underlying norm in the slums of 
Nairobi is balanced reciprocity by which one simply repays an investment as if it 
were an interest-free loan. By contrast, most of the data from developed countries 
support the norm of conditional reciprocity in which the two parties see the 
relationship more as a partnership in which both players accrue profit. In the 
first case there is no relationship between trust and reciprocity, as measured by 
the experiment, but in the second the two are positively correlated. What is 
important for development, however, is the fact that conditional reciprocity is 
more socially efficient. Other examples of measured community-level differences 
9in the underlying norms driving behaviour can be seen in Danielson and Holm 
(2003) and Carter and Castillo (2003). 
Without the Kenyan outlier, the non-students also seem to demonstrate 
more trustworthiness. The simple regression of the rate of return on the fraction 
sent, a student dummy, and the interaction of the two shows that the student 
intercept is significantly lower (p<0.05) and that the student gradient is steeper 
(p<0.10).  This seems to reiterate what was noted about Russia by Gaechter et 
al., (2004): student trust experiments should also been seen as lower bounds on 
prosocial behaviour. 
There are also a few methodological lessons to be learned from these trust 
experiments. First, it seems pretty unambiguous that second-mover behaviour in 
the TG measures trustworthiness or reciprocity, more generally; however, first-
mover behaviour might be harder to interpret. For example, to what extent do 
first-movers see their transfer as a donation without any expectation of a return? 
To examine this potential altruism confound, experimenters have followed Cox 
(2004) and run dictator games in addition to TGs. In the dictator game (DG) the 
first-mover simply makes a transfer to a passive second-mover. Because there is 
obviously no self-interested reason to transfer money (the game is anonymous), 
transfers are interpreted as measures of altruism. If one is willing to assume that 
trust and altruism are additively separable, then pure trust is just the difference 
between how much one transfers in the TG and how much one transfers in the 
DG. We have identified five experiments that conduct both TGs and DGs. 
Interestingly, three of them were conducted in South Africa and find that the 
amount of “pure” trust is between 21% (Carter and Castillo, 2003) and 36% 
(Ashraf, et al., 2005a) with Burns (2004a) finding more pure trust (49%) among 
high school students. Elsewhere in the world the estimates also hover around 50% 
of the amount sent.
4 
There also now seems to be some consensus that the standard trust 
question used in the General Social Survey and the World Values Survey (WVS), 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
need to be very careful in dealing with people, is a better measure of 
trustworthiness than trust. Following Glaeser et al., (2000), Lazzarini et al., 
10(2004) and Johansson-Stenman et al., (2004) regress both trust and 
trustworthiness on the surveyed trust response and find that the survey question 
correlates much higher with trustworthiness than with trust. In other words, 
those people who state higher levels of trust in strangers are actually more 
trustworthy. One way to look at this result is as a test of the validity of surveyed 
trust questions. A related question asks about the validity of the measures 
elicited in the TG. The good news is that Karlan (2005) in a Peruvian TG study 
with participants in a group lending program does find correlations between game 
behaviour and loan repayment behaviour; however the results are mixed. On one 
hand second-mover “trustworthiness” behaviour appears to be a robust predictor 
of repaying one’s debt but, on the other hand, more “trusting” first-movers are 
actually less likely to repay. Like Schechter (2004), Karlan concludes that first-
mover behaviour might be confounded by risk preferences. Risk-takers are more 
prone to taking bad risks that leave them unable to repay their loans and these 
same people appear more trusting in the TG. 
Because the related literature on social capital (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 
1997) has focused on trust and trustworthiness, there has been more interest in 
running the trust game in developing communities. This relative wealth of data 
means we can go a little further in analyzing the links between the behavioural 
measures and economic outcomes. Keep in mind however, that this exercise is 
really just meant to pique the interest of researchers in these relationships. 
Using information from the World Fact Book (2001) and the WVS, we 
gathered economic data (GPD per capita, GDP growth rate, percent of the 
population in poverty, Gini coefficients, and unemployment rates) and mean 
responses to the survey trust question from as many of the eighteen countries 
represented in Table 2 as possible. The first step was to see if there are any links 
between the WVS measure of trust used by Knack and Keefer and the 
experimental measures of trust. Because the WVS does not cover six of the 
countries in the sample, the correlation is based on only 12 observations. 
However, the result is encouraging; the correlation is positive, rho=0.51 and is 
significant at the 10% level indicating that countries with more trust measured 
by the WVS also demonstrate more trust (i.e., send more), on average, in the TG. 
11The second step is to look for correlations between our experimental 
measures of trust and the economic indicators. In addition to plotting the 
relationship between the average amount sent in the TG and the real growth rate 
of GDP (as in Knack and Keefer) Figure 2 also plots the relationship between the 
behavioural trust data and the fraction of the population in poverty, the Gini 
coefficient as a measure of inequality, and the rate of unemployment.
5 In each 
case the correlations are significant at the 5% level or better. Countries with 
higher growth rates are associated with more trust (rho=0.51, p=0.02), countries 
with less poverty are associated with more trust (rho=-0.66, p<0.01), countries in 
which the division of economic gains is more unequal are associated with less 
trust (rho=-0.48, p=0.04) and higher unemployment is associated with less trust 
(rho=-0.64, p<0.01). While all these relationships are provocative, the 
particularly strong correlation between poverty and trust indicates that a lot of 
worthwhile research might be done in this area. 
2.3 Fairness and Altruism 
There are two ways to think about distributional norms that may influence 
dyadic interactions. In the simplest case, norms of altruism dictate how 
generously one person must treat another when the second person has little or no 
power to control the outcome. These norms govern many philanthropic acts. 
Things are a little more complicated, however, when the second person has 
enough power to retaliate against perceived injustices. To differentiate the norms 
that dictate behaviour in these situations, we use the term fairness. 
Experimenters have developed two simple games to measure norms of fairness 
and altruism. One game, the Dictator Game, was defined in the previous section. 
The second game is the Ultimatum Game or UG. In the Ultimatum Game two 
players are provisionally allocated a pie to split. The first-mover (proposer) offers 
a share to the second-mover (responder) who accepts or rejects the offer. 
Accepted offers are implemented and rejections result in both players receiving 
nothing. Any division is a Nash equilibrium because a strategy for the responder 
is a rejection threshold (i.e., proposers could not deviate down and do better 
when paired with a responder who’s lowest acceptable offer is just being met). 
12There is only one subgame perfect equilibrium, however. No responder will choose 
a rejection threshold larger than zero, because she could do better by accepting 
lower offers. That is, rejecting should be an empty threat. Knowing this, 
proposers need not offer more than some small amount. This game has been 
played hundreds of times in developed countries and while there is some variation 
in behaviour across countries (see Roth et al., 1991), most behaviour deviates 
from the subgame perfect equilibrium in systematic ways. What is interesting 
from a development perspective is the variety of distributional norms that arise, 
whether or not these norms are supported by rejection behaviour and the 
economic factors that determine the norms. 
Recently the UG and DG have been played at substantial stakes in a 
number of places outside the industrialized west. Fairness behaviour in the UG is 
summarized in Table 3 and Table 4 summarizes altruism behaviour in the DG. 
Again, subgame perfection is a poor predictor in these two games. In each case, 
the mean allocation to the second person is substantially greater than zero and, 
in the UG, low offers are routinely rejected which suggests that fairness norms 
are enforced. If you focus on the subset of cases in which both UG and DG data 
exist you can see that while students in the U.S. offer considerably less when the 
second person can not punish, this is not true in general. In Carpenter et al. 
(2005a) and Henrich et al., (2006) students offer slightly more than 41% of the 
pie in the UG, on average, but only 25% and 32% in the DG, respectively. 
However, the difference between the mean UG and DG offers in the developing 
world tends to be much smaller. This suggests that students in the United States 
are more sensitive to differences in the strategic environment of a game and the 
behaviour of other people appears to be more norm-driven. There is another 
dimension to the Henrich et al., (2006) data that suggests the power of local 
norms. In some cases participants in the field reject offers that are too high in 
addition to offers that are too low. 
In the future it will be interesting and important to better understand the 
variation in the distributional norms that arise in developing communities and 
how the evolved norms interact with other formal institutions. Specifically, given 
the lack of formal (or reliable) means to adjudicate disputes in many developing 
13communities, it will be interesting to see what norms evolve and how they affect 
the economic performance of the communities. To date, there has been little 
research to inform these important questions. However, the preliminary results 
are provocative. In their study of 15 small-scale societies, Henrich et al., (2001) 
find that two factors: the local payoffs to cooperation and the degree of market 
integration explain 68% of the variation in UG offers. Those societies in which 
team work is essential to production (e.g., the Lamelara whale fishermen) are 
societies with strong sharing norms while societies composed of small bands of 
isolated and independent family groups (e.g., the Machiguenga) are not 
particularly generous towards outsiders (nor do they expect the outsiders to be 
generous). These data also support the old Hirschman (1982) theory of civilizing 
markets. People in the societies that are more integrated into markets have more 
experience dealing with strangers and this experience seems to foster more 
fairness.
6 
More recently, an expanded standardized set of experiments has been 
conducted by Henrich et al., (2006) in a number of the same locations as the 
2001 study. Table 3 shows that the second visit to the Hadza (Tanzania), the 
Tsimane (Bolivia), and the Au (PNG) resulted in data that look a lot like what 
was gathered in 2001. While it is not the same people playing the game, this 
result is a mild version of test-retest reliability and should encourage field 
experimenters that the behaviour measured in these experiments is somewhat 
robust. There are two other findings in Henrich et al., (2006) that are worth 
mentioning. First, they find that community level differences explain much more 
of the variation in play than individual differences.
7 This supports the idea that 
distributional norms are local phenomena and therefore may vary with local 
economic conditions. Second, these data confirm that distributive norms are 
supported by costly punishment. Not only does the rejection behaviour of second-
movers in the UG correlate with mean offers by first-movers, using another 
version of the DG in which an otherwise unaffected bystander can punish the 
dictator for low offers, the researchers find that the willingness to punish in this 
variant of the DG correlates strongly with offers in the normal version of the DG. 
14In other words, people are not hypocrites – those who are fairer are more likely 
to insist on fairness by others. 
While there is some variation in UG and DG play across communities, in 
many places observations with non-student populations pile up on the 50-50 split 
(e.g., Carpenter et al., 2005a). Although this is interesting in the anthropological 
sense of a human universal, the number of 50-50 splits limits the extent to which 
the UD and DG can be used to measure fairness norms. To make the games more 
useful as instruments participants need to be “pushed off” the 50-50 split 
somehow. Recently, Catherine Eckel, Kate Johnson and Duncan Thomas have 
developed a comparative DG to be used in Mexico. The comparative DG was 
constructed in the spirit of Sahlins (1972) who proposed a set of concentric social 
distance circles emanating from the individual. Your family comprises the inner 
most circle, your tribe or some other ingroup comprises the next circle and so on. 
You extend and expect different degrees of fairness and reciprocity to and from 
individuals in different circles. In the comparative DG you are asked to propose 
an allocation to a family member, a person in your village and a stranger from a 
different village. Framing the game in this manner affects behaviour as you 
would expect. The point, however, is that these differences are more informative 
than the standard one-decision DG. 
The last two lessons that we find in the fairness data are that 
deservingness is a strong predictor of altruism and social preference experiments 
seem to also be good ways to measure social interaction effects (Durlauf, 2002). 
In Fong (2005) students play a DG in which the recipient will be a local welfare 
recipient. The amount given depends on whether the potential recipient indicates 
her willingness to “pull herself up by her bootstraps.” Those recipients who 
appear industrious yield significantly more than those who appear lazy. Similar 
deservingness effects are found in Branas-Garza (2003) who finds that donations 
to recipients are approximately six times larger when the recipient is identified as 
poor and Burns (2004a) in which South African participants use school status 
and race to proxy for deservingness. Castillo and Carter (2003) implement trust 
and dictator games along with a survey to investigate what Manski (2000) calls 
social interaction effects; they show how to exploit the variation in behaviour and 
15socio-economic characteristics at both the individual and group level to identify 
whether peer effects influence choices. This methodology is powerful because 
equivalent data that occur naturally are very hard to come by. 
2.4 Time and Risk 
An old fable in the development literature can be paraphrased as follows: people 
in underdeveloped countries are poor partially because they have preferences that 
are inconsistent with growth. They have high discount rates and are risk averse 
enough so that it is impossible for them to save and take the risks necessary to 
begin to accumulate capital. One of the earliest expressions of this viewpoint 
comes from Irving Fisher who wrote, “A small income, other things being equal, 
tends to produce a high rate of impatience, partly from the thought that provision 
for the present is necessary both for the present itself and for the future as well, 
and partly from lack of foresight and self-control” (Fisher, 1930:73). 
8 In  his 
innovative field study, Binswanger (1980) noted that risk preference differences 
are important because policy makers can do something about hindrances to the 
access of capital, but may be able to do less about the risk attitudes of those 
whom capital would help. In this subsection we consider the evidence on this 
conjecture. 
Risk experiments fall into two classes which essentially differ only in the 
way that participants register their choices. The top of Table 5 lists the risk 
aversion studies we consider. One class is based on what we call the 
Accept/Reject Lotteries experiment. The most important methodological 
contribution in this class is Holt and Laury (2002). In this experiment, 
participants are presented two columns of pair-wise lottery choices and they must 
accept one lottery per line and reject the other. Initially, the first column 
dominates the second in terms of expected payoff and variance in the payoffs, but 
eventually, as the probability of the high outcome in the second column increases, 
the expected value of the second column starts to dominate. Those who are more 
risk averse will choose the first column longer than those who are more risk 
seeking. Because this experiment forces participants to choose between two 
discrete options, their preferences can only be estimated on an interval. On 
16average, Holt and Laury find that student participants exhibit levels of constant 
relative risk aversion between 0.68 and 0.97 when they ratchet up the size of the 
possible payouts which, in the context of the lotteries offered, is very risk averse 
behaviour. 
The second class of risk experiments is what we refer to as the Choose 
Lottery experiment in which participants are also presented a series of lotteries, 
but in this case they are asked to pick one from a list which controls for the 
probability of winning a large prize (i.e., they are all determined by the toss of a 
coin) but varies the high and low payouts and, in doing so, the expected payoff. 
Depending on how risk averse a participant is, he should trade off expected 
return for less variability. Binswanger (1980) was the first to conduct this sort of 
risk analysis and what is at least as interesting as his protocol is the fact that he 
conducted his experiment in rural India with peasant farmers. While, he does 
hypothesize that increases in wealth will be associated with lower risk aversion 
(remember the fable) this result is not borne out in the regression analysis. What 
is also interesting is that, despite the differences in the protocols, Binswanger’s 
average estimate of constant relative risk aversion fits within the bounds of the 
estimate calculated by Holt and Laury. Expanding the comparisons (Holt and 
Laury, Binswanger, Barr, Harrison et al., Jimenez, Nielsen and Wik & Holden) 
gives us a better idea of whether there are differences between people in 
developed countries and those in developing countries. As one can see, there is 
some variation in the results but it is not explained by development.  In fact, the 
upper bounds on the Holt and Laury and Jimenez data are larger than the mean 
values found in the developing world. Overall, there does not appear to be much 
support for the idea that poor people in developing countries are more risk averse 
than richer people in developed countries.
9 
The bottom of Table 5 lists the experiments on time preferences that we 
have found. Even more so than with risk, time preference experiments come in 
many shapes and sizes. Not only is it difficult to compare studies because of 
differences in their protocols, there are other issues that confound the comparison 
of time preference data. First, the reported discount rates are very sensitive to 
how interval choices are interpreted. For example, most studies use exponential 
17discounting, but Kirby et al., (2002) decide that hyperbolic discounting is more 
relevant. Further, even if researchers stick to exponential discounting, the 
number of times that interest is assumed to be compounded per year (obviously) 
affects the implied discount rate although this assumption is rarely mentioned. 
Second, many of these experiments are confounded by the credibility of the 
researcher. In most experiments participants are paid on the spot, but by their 
very nature, time preference experiments must ask people to wait for their 
payments. Normally the researchers are strangers to the participants and 
therefore, the experimental data may be biased towards higher discount rates 
because the participants have two reasons, a preference for the present and not 
trusting the experimenter, for choosing a payment today versus a promised 
payment in the future. Third, the delays between payments vary with each study 
which adds one more factor to control for in any analysis. 
As our developed country benchmarks, consider the estimates of individual 
discount rates (IDRs) gathered by Coller and Williams (1999) and Harrison et al., 
(2002). The nice thing about these estimates is that the experimenters have 
learned from the past and conduct their experiments carefully.  For example, to 
control (at least partially) for the credibility problem of many experiments, these 
two papers employ, front end delays which simply mean that there is no promise 
of money today. Instead, people choose, for example, between money tomorrow 
and more money in a week. If participants think there is some chance that the 
experimenters will welch on a promise to pay in the future, they should not 
expect for them to be more likely to welch on a payment one week from today 
than on one that is due tomorrow. Because of the asymmetry of their data, 
Coller and Williams (1999) report median IDRs between 17% and 20% using 
student data while Harrison et al., (2002), using data from a large sample of 
Danes, report mean overall IDRs that control for many demographic factors of 
28%. 
The evidence on whether poor people are relatively more impatient is 
mixed. Along with their risk aversion experiment, Barr and Packard (2000) 
gather IDRs using a hypothetical questionnaire. Considering the overall variation 
in estimates, the mean IDR reported in Barr and Packard, 43%, is in the ballpark 
18of the developed world estimates. However, in their fuller analysis Barr and 
Packard go on to show that income is marginally significantly associated with 
discount rates (p<0.10): those with larger incomes do appear more patient. 
Likewise, Kirby et al., (2002) who gather data from the Tsimane’ horticulturalists 
of the Bolivian rainforest show that discount rates are correlated with age 
(positively), education (negatively) and income (negatively) but that they are not 
correlated significantly with wealth. Considering behaviours instead of outcomes, 
Neilsen (2001) in a study of peasant farmers on Madagascar finds a mean IDR of 
117%.
10 More importantly, Neilsen finds that people who report living in areas in 
which a lot of deforestation has occurred have significantly higher discount rates. 
Interpretation of the risk and time preference data are a little harder than 
with the social preference data because there are competing models in each 
domain that have recently gathered a lot of empirical support. Most people, for 
instance, now believe that the curvature of one’s utility function depends on 
whether the gamble is formulated in losses or gains. Prospect theory hypothesizes 
that people tend to be risk averse in gains but, relatively, risk seeking in losses 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Obviously, because people in developing 
countries face real risks and development policies often add to this uncertainty, it 
is important to categorize behavioural predispositions as accurately as possible. 
Harrison et al., (2005) allow the data to determine the extent to which 
conventional expected utility theory versus prospect theory predicts behaviour 
and find that the two models play roughly equal roles in explaining the behaviour 
of poor participants in India, Ethiopia, and Uganda. One of the implications of 
prospect theory motivating choices is that the subjective probability weights that 
people assign to outcomes may be very different than the objective weights they 
should use. 
In their estimates, Harrison et al., (2005) find that when participants are 
told that an outcome has a 50-50 chance of occurring, they behave as if the 
chance was as low as 10%. The authors speculate that recent droughts in the 
areas in which the experiments were conducted may have accounted for this 
general pessimism about uncertain events. The obvious lesson, however, is that 
with half the people systematically under-weighing the likelihood of good 
19outcomes, for instance, it becomes even harder to rally support for change. The 
next step is to assess the degree to which this probability bias is endogenous and 
whether simple, first-step, policies would be helpful in changing attitudes towards 
change. 
There are also two competing models to describe intertemporal decision-
making. Economics and Finance rely on simple exponential discounting, however 
many recent studies with students in the developed world have found that 
models that assume hyperbolic discounting work at least as well (see the review 
of Frederick et al., 2002). Compared to the exponential standard, hyperbolic 
discounters appear to have inconsistent preferences: they appear impatient in the 
short term but extremely patient when considering decisions that will not have to 
be taken until some distant future date. In other words (i.e., those of Elster, 
1989), hyperbolic discounters suffer from a “weakness of will.” They know what 
is good for them in the long run but when the long run becomes the short run 
they can’t overcome their impulses. What are the implications for development 
policy? It might be the case that people who suffer from weakness of will just 
need help committing to more financially sound decisions. As Mullainathan (2004) 
suggests, rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), might serve this 
purpose. Each member of a ROSCA contributes an amount to a group fund that 
goes to one of the members at each meeting. Membership requires people to 
contribute and takes this money out of the member’s hands until it is their turn 
to receive the fund. While this forced savings pays no interest, it does act as a 
commitment device that is supported by social pressure to not free-ride. 
Is there some relationship between poverty, the lack of formal institutions 
and hyperbolic discounting? In some sense this is just a new version of the Fisher 
fable - is the commitment problem greater in developing communities than 
anywhere else? Unfortunately, because most economists still assume exponential 
discounting, there is not a lot of evidence; however, we have found three 
interesting studies. As a non-student benchmark, Harrison et al., (2002) conclude 
that in a nationally representative sample of Danes there is not a lot of evidence 
of hyperbolic discounting. There is heterogeneity but most people have relatively 
constant discount rates over the one- to three-year horizon. Kirby et al., (2002) 
20estimate hyperbolic discount rates among Amerindian horticulturalists in Bolivia 
but because the maximum delay in their experiment is less than 6 months, the 
difference between the implied hyperbolic and exponential rates of time 
preference are too small to determine which model fits best. By construction, 
there would be little evidence that the Amerindians suffer from weakness of will. 
In a very cleanly designed field experiment, Pender (1996) returns to the same 
villages in India in which Hans Binswanger conducted his seminal risk 
experiments. For our purposes, the key result is that while he does find discount 
rates to be higher in a 7-month experiment than in a 12-month experiment, the 
12- 19- and 24-month results are indistinguishable. In other words, there is just 
not enough evidence to make any conclusions about the relationship between 
development and the prevalence of hyperbolic discounting. 
In sum we find little evidence of differences in risk and time preferences 
between people in developing and developed economies and therefore there must 
be other reasons that some countries continue to lag behind. Binswanger (1980) 
suggest that access to credit might be much more of a problem. This explanation 
jibes with other behavioural evidence. For example, neither Barr and Packard 
(2000) nor Jimenez (2003) find that risk preferences predict whether a person 
chooses to be self-employed. Either the risk experiments are not very externally 
valid (which would be contrary to Dohmen et al., 2005) or other factors like 
access to credit dominate these decisions. 
3. Running Experiments in the Field 
In this section we reflect on our experiences and on the protocols used by others 
to formulate a few lessons about running experiments in the field. Other 
researchers have discussed some of these issues
11; however, we think that our 
choice of topics might be more valuable for development economists. We begin 
by talking about a few attributes of the participants and researchers and then 
switch to comments on the procedural details of running experiments in the field. 
There are good reasons why students are known as a “convenience” 
sample of the population. Students are mostly literate, numerate, are somewhat 
used to thinking abstractly, and are accustomed to being told what to do. All 
21these attributes make the running of decision-making experiments go more 
smoothly. In the field, however, one should never take literacy or numeracy for 
granted. Furthermore, we have found that experiments can often remind non­
student participants of the exams that caused them to leave school as soon as 
possible. It is in the interest of the researcher to make the experiment seem more 
interesting and straight-forward than a test. 
Given, people have been somewhat successful at writing simple 
instructions that rely more on pictures, diagrams and examples than on complex 
grammar and payoff functions, our sense is that although literacy is a large 
problem, numeracy might be something that field experimenters may stumble on 
and not be able to recover from. In particular, many people have no idea about 
the basic laws of probability. For example, Herb Gintis once offered a plausible 
alternative explanation for why the mean offer in the Henrich (2000) UG run 
with the Machegeunga in Peru was so low. The published reason has to do with 
culture and the low frequency of interacting with strangers. While this reasoning 
fits well with the other observations from the 15 small scale societies project, a 
plausible alternative is that nothing is random to people living in Amazonia. 
Henrich flipped a coin to see if each participant was going to be the first-mover 
or the second-mover. A coin flip does not mean the same thing to a person who 
believes that supernatural forces determine the course of events. Such a person 
may think that she was chosen to be the first-mover for a reason, and with that 
mindset demanding most of the pie does not seem unreasonable. Similar 
reasoning on the part of the person that does not win the toss may influence 
one’s willingness to reject low offers. The point, however, is that these participant 
attributes all pose additional problems in the field. Field experimenters need to 
be even more clever because their protocols almost always have to be extremely 
straight-forward and simple. 
To illustrate the potential importance of numeracy, we can share 
preliminary results from a study of truck driver trainees in the United States. 
With 749 of the targeted 1000 observations collected, Stephen Burks, Jeffrey 
Carpenter, Lorenz Goette and Aldo Rustichini have found that a standard test of 
numeracy correlates highly with trainee behaviour in a variety of experiments. 
22Based on simple correlation coefficients, more numerate people are less impulsive 
(p<0.01), more cooperative as the first-mover in a sequential PD (p<0.02), more 
reciprocal as the second-mover in a sequential PD (p<0.01), better at backward 
induction (p<0.01) and have lower discount rates in the short run (p<0.01). 
We also need to worry about the attributes of the people conducting the 
experiments. Both the protocol and the experimenter have to be credible. Field 
experimenters are rightly criticized by anthropologists for “helicoptering” into a 
site to conduct an experiment after spending next to no time with, and knowing 
next to nothing about, the participants. It is reasonable to fear that this 
behaviour affects the credibility of the experimenter and may bias the results. A 
concrete example may better illustrate this point. As mentioned in section 2d, 
time preference experiments are often conducted with front-end delays, precisely 
because the lack of credibility of the experimenter will bias the results towards 
making people appear more impatient than they really are. Further, if one’s 
assessment of another’s credibility is, in turn, determined by your economic 
circumstances, the bias could easily be stronger in developing countries. One 
obvious way to mitigate any credibility bias is to spend considerable time in the 
studied communities. This is often not possible, but at a minimum, teaming up 
with people who have more credibility might be a close substitute. 
Sampling and recruitment is an issue for all of behavioural economics, but 
the complications arising from non-random sampling and non-representative 
recruitment may be more pronounced in the field. The typical lab recruiting 
protocol is to run an advertisement in the school newspaper or send out a mass 
email. Not surprisingly, research in psychology suggests that this method is not 
likely to result in a representative sample (Zelenski et al., 2003). For that matter, 
assignment to treatment is also usually not very random. If treatment A happens 
on Monday and treatment B is scheduled for Tuesday, there could easily be some 
important unobservable that affects behaviour and is correlated with the 
schedules of students. These problems are likely to be exacerbated in the field 
because recruitment is often even more chaotic. Given the researcher has spent a 
lot of grant money to get to the site, recruitment often becomes like big game 
hunting. The researcher sets up her blind near the “watering hole” and waits for 
23the prey/participants to show up. As a practical matter, this means that 
recruitment is much more likely to happen by word of mouth and therefore peer 
effects, for example, might add to the sampling problems. When friends or 
relatives show up for a particular session, and the experimental design is highly 
sensitive to “social ties” (e.g. cooperation, trust, public goods, common-pool 
resource games) one may prefer to assign them to different sessions. 
Given field participants are likely to find the instructions and protocol 
challenging, field experimenters should do what they can to improve how well the 
game is understood. In most cases, simple things can help increase the quality of 
the data gathered in the field. Paper and pen experiments, which are often more 
difficult to design and take longer to run, are actually preferred to computerized 
experiments in the field because you do not need to worry about computer 
literacy on top of the other participant attributes mentioned above. Instructions 
should not be long complicated descriptions of payoff functions. Our experience 
suggests that reading the instructions aloud, using several examples, and 
providing large posters of the decision sheets greatly improves the understanding 
of the participants. We find that examples work well, but it is hard to decide 
which examples to include because examples may also prime participants on one 
strategy or another. The jury is still out on framing. On one hand, people argue 
that framing is bad because frames may also cue norm-driven behaviour and we 
are looking for robust behaviours that may not be situation-specific. On the other 
hand, mild frames may assure that all the participants are playing the game that 
the experimenter intended. In other words, it may be more important for 
everyone to be “on the same page.” 
Recently, Henrich et al., (2006) claim to have successfully implemented 
the strategy method in their field experiments, but this method should be used 
with caution. In the strategy method participants are asked to provide a full 
strategy of behaviour instead of responding to whatever stimulus they encounter. 
A second-mover, for example, in the UG provides a full strategy by stating which 
offers she will accept and which offers she will reject, rather than accepting or 
rejecting the offer that she is presented with. The benefit is obvious; the 
experimenter receives much more information. However, the potential problem 
24with this method of eliciting responses is that many people do not naturally think 
in terms of strategies and therefore it is hard for them to think of what they 
would do in every possible situation while it is easy to think about what they will 
do in the situation in which they find themselves. 
In some settings cash payments are less desirable than payment in 
durables. In those developing communities that are not very well integrated into 
markets, cash is not particularly appealing while tools and other durables are. 
Hence, to properly incentivise participants one should be sensitive to their needs. 
For example, in his study of the time preferences of poor farmers and agricultural 
workers in Andhra Pradesh, Pender (1996) used rice as payment instead of cash. 
Regardless of the incentive type, paying on average one to two days wage for a 
half day session seems to have created the necessary salience for participants in 
the field. 
There is one last thing that field experimenters seem to worry about more 
than lab experimenters – cross talk. Cross talk occurs when one set of 
participants talks about the experiment to another set that have not yet 
participated. This can be a problem because experiments that happen over a 
sequence of days may implicitly set up a system of overlapping generations so 
that later choices are biased by earlier behaviour. Cross talk may also introduce 
selection problems because it could affect who participates. Preventing cross talk 
is a major challenge. Some people try to recruit large numbers of participants to 
run concurrent sessions and other people build in waiting periods to separate the 
people who already have participated from those that have not. In either case, 
experimenters should keep record of the exact day and time of each session to 
keep track of possible cross talk effects. 
4. The Frontiers of Preference Research in LDCs 
We conclude by offering a few thoughts on what is on the horizon for preference-
related experimental research in developing countries. We begin by discussing 
each of the areas covered in Section 2 before ending with a discussion of a few 
other related ideas. 
25We still have limited knowledge of the determinants, stability or 
implications of social preferences. However, the little that we do know (see Tables 
1-4) suggests that economic outcomes might be sensitive to the distribution of 
social preferences. Considering the propensity to cooperate in social dilemmas, we 
have just begun to understand the relationship between formal institutions (laws, 
in particular) and informal norms of cooperation. We should know more about 
the co-evolution of formal and informal rules to promote group welfare. Can one 
imagine what might crowd in norms of cooperation? 
The experiments we have surveyed suggest that information is an 
important determinant of individual cooperativeness because most people are to 
some degree conditionally cooperative. Information cues the norm of conditional 
cooperation directly and affects the expectations that allow simultaneous games 
to be solved cooperatively. We should conduct research to better understand the 
information that helps promote and sustain the social preferences that support 
cooperative behaviour and collective action. 
Once the basic trust game has been run in more countries, it would be 
interesting to replicate the work of Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack 
(2001) using behaviourally validated data. We imagine, based on the interesting 
correlations in Figure 2 that focusing more sharply on local economic conditions 
and experimental measures of trust and trustworthiness might yield interesting 
results. Focusing at the community level will also allow economists to test the 
hypothesized links between trust, trustworthiness and the existence of poverty 
traps. The poverty trap explanation of low growth is slightly different than the 
standard linear social capital model. Poverty traps are thought to exist because 
there are multiple stable trust-growth equilibria. If these models better describe 
reality then the key is to shock the system out of the basin of attraction of the 
low trust – low growth equilibrium. 
Rosenzweig (1988) concludes that extended families often substitute for 
formal institutions in developing countries. Specifically, disputes are more likely 
to be adjudicated through the family than through a formal system of courts in 
many places. Bonds of common experience and altruism enable families to 
transcend the informational barriers that tend to hinder the development of 
26formal institutions. If this is indeed the case, then field experiments should be the 
obvious way to identify the norms of fairness and altruism at the core of these 
family structures. Once the norms have been identified, it will be equally 
interesting to see how well the variation in norms accounts for important 
economic indicators like education attainment and income. 
The evidence that we have gathered suggests that poor people are not 
more risk averse (or risk-loving) than rich people and there is mixed evidence on 
whether poor people are more impatient than rich people. Where should we go 
from here? Researchers have already begun asking whether the canonical models 
of risk and time preferences fit the data best, but given the limited amount of 
evidence we have from the field, it would be interesting to settle the “Fisher 
Fable” debate once and for all by conducting a more systematic test. A 
standardized protocol should be developed based on the latest research from the 
field and experiments should be conducted in “sister cities” straddling the 
development divide that control for many of the differences (e.g., distance to a 
major city and population density) that confound current comparisons. 
Mullainathan (2004) lists a number of development puzzles (e.g., poverty 
traps, non-optimal resource use) that might be explained by hyperbolic 
discounting, however the data doesn’t currently exist to test whether poor people 
are more likely to discount the present more than the future. Not only do we not 
know the extent to which people in developing communities discount 
hyperbolically, we also do not have much knowledge about the degree to which 
this preference is endogenous. In what sense might the conditions of poverty 
cause hyperbolic discounting? What is the impact of education on the propensity 
to discount hyperbolically? In the spirit of Ashraf et al., (2005b), what policies 
and contracts can be offered to help poor people commit to savings, given they 
may discount hyperbolically? 
Finally, in many places we have pointed to the interaction and tension 
between formal and informal institutions. We consider this to be another area in 
which the return to research will be high. People traditionally think of informal 
institutions as existing before formal institutions are established; however, we 
hope that this is no longer obvious to the reader. We think that there are plenty 
27of cases in which formal and informal institutions coexist, there are cases in 
which formal institutions crowd out informal institutions and there are even cases 
in which informal institutions fill the void following the decline of formal 
institutions. In the future it will be important to use experiments to analyze the 
relationship between formal and informal institutions. For example, is it actually 
the case (as proposed by Hirschman, 1982) that markets, as formal institutions, 
simply replace other informal economic relationships? 
Our sense is that most development economists are still wary of the use of 
experiments. While being strong advocates, we understand the reticence – 
behavioural economists are only beginning to give other practitioners a reason to 
care. This issue is often linked to the idea of external validity: do the behavioural 
propensities that we capture in experiments correlate with economic activity 
outside the field lab? Other economists may also be sceptical of the process of 
recruitment and sampling. A major methodological step will be to work to make 
our samples more representative and to reduce the self-selection bias that might 
be attached with voluntary participation. Making sure that the incentives used 
correspond to the opportunity cost of participating and, at a minimum, collecting 
demographics from people who decline participation should help. 
As the reader can see, there has already been a surprisingly large amount 
of experimental work done on preferences in developing countries. While some 
questions have been answered, we think that the major contribution of the 
current literature is the establishment a field methodology. We also think that 
these methods will now set the stage for new, more policy oriented research. If 
policies are aimed at inducing changes in behaviour to improve outcomes, 
experiments can provide detailed behavioural data about the effects of certain 
incentives, institutions, or information on a specific context or group. In the 
future, these data may also make it feasible to calibrate and tailor policies at the 
local level. 
Throughout the paper we have highlighted data that contradicts standard 
assumptions and theories of development and we have illustrated how policy 
relevant research can be conducted using field experiments. We conclude by 
summarizing some of the more policy relevant points. Experimental work on the 
28distribution of resources within a household (see section 2.1) is extremely 
important given grantors typically assume that conditional cash transfers must 
be put in the hands of mothers to get resources to children. An example is the 
Progressa program in Mexico. Field experiments will test the assumptions at the 
foundation of this assumption. Must grantors target women because they are 
more altruistic towards their children or is it because they are more likely to 
invest in the future of their children? 
In section 2.3 we note the variety of distributional norms that exist. How 
might this heterogeneity affect policy? As Elinor Ostrom pointed out, some 
policies function on the basis of state or other third party intervention and others 
arise endogenously (Ostrom, 1998). As her work suggests, the right policy often 
depends on community attributes like the strength and composition of local 
norms. In this sense local distributive customs (like those catalogued above) often 
correlate with the extent to which intervention helps the situation or makes it 
worse. Moreover, the relationship between the nature of institutions (formal 
versus informal) and the potency of an intervention extends to situations in 
which trust and reciprocity (section 2.2) support more efficient outcomes. 
Experiments on time and risk preferences will also continue to influence 
policy. Measuring these preferences allows policy-makers to first assess the extent 
to which preferences hinder accumulation. So far there is little evidence that 
people remain poor because they are risk averse and the evidence on the 
relationship with time preferences is mixed. However, once the preferences have 
been measured more precisely the results may point to more effective policies. If 
it is the case that preferences act as constraints, then commitment mechanisms 
like ROSCAs in the case of impatience should be explored and for constraints 
due to attitudes towards risk farmers should be educated in the actual riskiness 
of new technologies rather than to continue to allow the ambiguity of the choice 
to paralyze them (Engle-Warnick et al., 2006). On the other hand, if preferences 
do not seem to correlate with poverty, it is time to redouble efforts on providing 
access to credit, for example. 
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31Table 1 – Cooperation in Developing Countries 
Game Study  Location  Students  Mean  Cooperation 
PD Cooper et al., (1996)  United States  Yes  22% cooperate 
PD  Hemesath and Pomponio (1998)  United States  Yes  25% cooperate 
China  Yes  54%  cooperate 
PD Tyson et al., (1988)  South Africa  Yes  45% cooperate w/black other 
Yes  37% cooperate w/white other 
VCM  Andreoni (1995)  United States  Yes  33% of endowment 
VCM  List (2004)  United States  No  32% of endowment - young 
No  43% of endowment - old 
VCM Barr  (2001)  Zimbabwe  No  48% of endowment, 52%
a 
VCM  Barr and Kinsey (2002)  Zimbabwe  No  53% of endowment - women 
Zimbabwe  No  48% of endowment - men 
VCM Carpenter et al., (2004a)  Vietnam  No  72% of endowment, 76%
a 
Thailand  No  61% of endowment, 73%
a 
VCM  Ensminger (2000)  Kenya  No  58% of endowment 
VCM Gaechter et al., (2004)  Russia  Yes  44% of endowment 
Russia  No  52% of endowment 
VCM  Henrich and Smith (2004)  Peru  No  23% of endowment 
Chile-Mapuche  No  33% of endowment 
Chile-Huinca  No  58% of endowment 
VCM Karlan  (2005)  Peru  No  81% of endowment
b 
CPR  Cardenas and Carpenter (2004)  United States  Yes  79% of Nash Extraction 
Colombia  Yes  74% of Nash Extraction 
CPR Cardenas et al., (2000)  Colombia  No  72% of Nash Extraction 
CPR Cardenas, et al., (2002)  Colombia  No  68% of Nash Extraction, 49%
c 
CPR Cardenas  (2003a)  Colombia  No  74% of Nash Extraction, 62%
c 
CPR  Velez et al (2006)  Colombia  No  80% of Nash Extraction 
Notes: 
a Without social sanctions, with social sanctions.  
b This results is from a threshold public goods 
game. 
c Without communication, with communication. 
32Table 2 – Trust in Developing Countries 
Study Location  Students  Fraction  Fraction  Return 
Sent  Returned  Ratio 
Berg et al., (1995)  United States  Yes  0.52  0.30  0.90 
Burks et al., (2003)  United States  Yes  0.65  0.40  1.31 
Ashraf et al., (2005a)  United States  Yes  0.41  0.23  0.58
 Russia  Yes  0.49  0.29  0.80
 South  Africa  Yes  0.43  0.27  0.73 
Barr (2003a)  Zimbabwe  No  0.43  0.43  1.28 
Buchan et al., (2003)  United States  Yes  0.65  0.45
a  1.35
 China  Yes  0.73  0.50
a  1.51
 Japan  Yes  0.68  0.50
a  1.51
 South  Korea  Yes  0.64  0.49
a  1.47 
Burns (2004b)  South Africa  Yes  0.33  0.23  0.70 
Cardenas (2003b)  Colombia  Yes  0.50  0.41  1.22 
Carter and Castillo (2002)  South Africa  No  0.53  0.38  1.14 
Castillo and Carter (2003)  Honduras  No  0.49  0.42  1.26 
Holm and Danielson (2005)  Tanzania  Yes  0.53  0.37  1.17
 Sweden  Yes  0.51  0.35  1.05 
Danielson and Holm (2003)  Tanzania  No  0.56  0.46  1.40 
Ensminger (2000)  Kenya  No  0.44  0.18  0.54 
Fehr and List (2004)  Costa Rica  Yes  0.40  0.32  0.96
 Costa  Rica  No  0.59  0.44  1.32 
Greig and Bohnet (2005)  Kenya  No  0.30  0.41  0.82 
Johansson-Stenman et al., (2004)  Bangladesh  No  0.46  0.46  1.38 
Karlan (2005)  Peru  No  0.46  0.43  1.12 
Koford (2001)  Bulgaria  Yes  0.63  0.46  1.34 
Lazzarini, et al., (2004)  Brazil  Yes  0.56  0.34  0.80 
Mosley and Verschoor (2003)  Uganda  No  0.49  0.33  0.99 
Schechter (2004)  Paraguay  No  0.47  0.44  1.31 
Wilson and Bahry (2002)  Russia  No  0.51  0.38  1.15 
Notes: 
a This figure differs from Buchan et al., (2003) because they include the second-mover’s 
endowment in the amount of money available to send back. 
33Table 3 – Fairness in Developing Countries (ultimatum game studies) 
Study Location  Students  Mean Proposal  Rejection Rate 
Carpenter et al., (2005a)  United States  Yes  0.41  0.05 
No  0.45  0.07 
Cameron (1999)  Indonesia  Yes  0.42  0.10 
Gowdy et al., (2003)  Nigeria  No  0.43  0.01 
Henrich et al., (2001)  Peru – Machiguenga  No  0.26  0.05 
Tanzania – Hadza  No  0.40, 0.27  0.19, 0.28 
Bolivia – Tsimane  No  0.37  0.00 
Ecuador – Quichua  No  0.27  0.15 
Mongolia – Torguud  No  0.35, 0.36  0.05, 
a 
Chile – Mapuche  No  0.34  0.07 
PNG – Au  No  0.43, 0.38  0.27, 0.40 
Tanzania – Sangu  No  0.41, 0.42  0.25, 0.05 
Zimbabwe  No  0.41, 0.45  0.10, 0.07
 Ecuador  –  Achuar  No  0.42  0.00 
Kenya – Orma  No  0.44  0.04
 Paraguay  –  Ache  No  0.51  0.00
 Indonesia  -  Lamelara  No  0.58  0.00 
Henrich et al., (2006)  United States  Yes  0.41  0.42
b 
 United  States  No  0.48 0.71
b 
 Kenya  -  Maragoli  No  0.25 0.96
b 
Kenya – Samburu  No  0.35 0.10
b 
 Kenya  –  Gusii  No  0.40 -
Ghana – Accra City  No  0.44 0.33
b 
 Tanzania  –  Hadza  No  0.26 0.42
b 
 Tanzania  –  Isanga  No  0.38 0.10
b 
Siberia – Dolgan  No  0.43 0.35
b 
 PNG  -  Au  No  0.44 0.43
b 
 PNG  –  Sursurunga  No  0.51 0.69
b 
Fiji – Yasawa  No  0.40 0.15
b 
Bolivia – Tsimane  No  0.27 0.03
b 
Colombia - Sanquianga  No  0.48 0.30
b 
Ecuador - Shuar  No  0.37  0.10
b 
Notes: PNG is Papua New Guinea. 
aSecond rejection rate not reported in the original. Two 
entries in a cell indicate two different samples in the same population. 
bStrategy method used so 
we report the probability that the lowest positive offer (10%) would be rejected. 
34 Table 4 – Altruism in Developing Countries (dictator game studies) 
Study Location  Students  Mean  Allocation 
Carpenter et al., 2005a)  United States  Yes  0.25 
No  0.45 
Ashraf et al., (2005a)  United States  Yes  0.24
 Russia  Yes  0.26 
 South  Africa  Yes  0.25 
Burns (2004a)  South Africa  Yes  0.26 
Cardenas and Carpenter (2004)  United States  Yes  0.27
 Colombia  Yes  0.19 
Carter and Castillo (2002)  South Africa  No  0.42 
Castillo and Carter (2003)  Honduras  No  0.42 
Holm and Danielson (2005)  Tanzania  Yes  0.24 
 Sweden  Yes  0.28 
Ensminger (2000)  Kenya  No  0.31 
Gowdy et al., (2003)  Nigeria  No  0.42 
Henrich et al., (2006)  United States  Yes  0.32
 United  States  No  0.47
 Kenya  -  Maragoli  No  0.35 
Kenya – Samburu  No  0.40
 Kenya  –  Gusii  No  0.33 
Ghana – Accra City  No  0.42
 Tanzania  –  Hadza  No  0.26
 Tanzania  –  Isanga  No  0.36 
Siberia – Dolgan  No  0.37
 PNG  -  Au  No  0.41
 PNG  –  Sursurunga  No  0.41 
Fiji – Yasawa  No  0.35 
Bolivia – Tsimane  No  0.26 
Colombia - Sanquianga  No  0.44 
Ecuador - Shuar  No  0.35 
Note: PNG is Papua New Guinea. 
35Table 5 – Risk and Time Preferences in Developing Countries 
Decision Task  Study  Location  Students  Mean Behaviour 
Risk: Accept/Reject Lotteries  Holt and Laury (2002)
b  USA Yes  0.68<CRRA
a<0.97 
Risk : Choose Lottery  Binswanger (1980)
 b  India No  CRRA
a = 0.71
c 
Risk : Choose Lottery  Wik and Holden (1998)
b  Zambia No  0.81<CRRA
a<2.0 
Risk : Choose Lottery  Barr (2003b)
b  Zimbabwe No  0.32<CRRA
a<0.81 
Risk : Choose Lottery  Harrison et al., (2005)  Ethiopia  No  CRRA
a = 0.05
c 
India 
CRRA
a = 0.84
c 
Uganda 
CRRA
a = 0.17
c 
Risk: Certainty Equivalent  Barr and Packard (2000)  Chile  No  CE
d= 0.57 
Risk: Certainty Equivalent  Henrich and McElreath  Chile &  No  CE
d(Mapuche)=0.7 
(2002)  Tanzania 
CE
d(Huinca)=0.4 
CE
d(Sangu)=0.68 
Risk: Accept/Reject Lotteries  Jimenez (2003)  Spain  Yes  0.40<CRRA
a <1.25 
Risk: Choose Lottery  Nielsen (2001)  Madagascar  No  CRRA
a= 0.32 
Risk: Bet on a die roll  Schechter (2005)  Paraguay  No  CRRA
a= 2.57 
Time: Accept/Reject Delays  Coller and Williams  USA Yes  17%<MIDR
f<20% 
(1999) 
Time: Accept/Reject Delays  Harrison et al., (2002)  Denmark  No  IDR
e = 28%
c 
Time: Questionnaire  Barr and Packard (2000)  Chile  No  IDR
e = 43% 
Time: Accept/Reject Delays  Kirby et al., (2002)  Bolivia  No  MHIDR
g= 12% 
Time: Choose Delay  Nielsen (2001)  Madagascar  No  IDR
e= 117% 
Time: Accept/Reject Delays  Pender (1996)  India  No  MIDR>50% 
Notes: 
aCRRA is the measure of constant relative risk aversion. 
bHigh stakes.  
cControlling for 
demographics. 
dCE is the mean certainty equivalent constructed from individual fixed effects in regressions 
with eight observations per participant that varied the odds of the high and low outcomes. This measure is 
expressed as a fraction of the high payout. 
eIDR is the estimated individual discount rate. 
fColler & Williams 
report the median individual discount rate (MIDR) because their analysis is sensitive to cutoffs and the 
distribution of responses in right-skewed.  
gKirby et al., (2002) report median hyperbolic individual discount 
rates based on the function PV=A/(1+kD) where A is the reward, k is the hyperbolic discount rate, and D 
is the delay in days. 
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1 Of course all this speculation is intended to be provocative and needs to be weighed against 
other explanations for the variation in play. One that is obvious, and should be remembered when 
comparing many of the results we review, is that protocols are not standardized in these 
experiments and the details of the game do often matter. 
2 Barr (2001) allowed participants to directly voice disapproval while participants in Carpenter et 
al., (2004a) paid a cost to send a message (an picture of an unhappy face) to the rest of the group 
when they were unhappy with contributions. 
3  This is how Berg et al. ran the game, but other variations have been seen.  For example, 
Glaeser et al., (2000) do not give an endowment to the second-mover and double, rather than 
triple, the transfer. 
4 First-movers may also view the game as more of a gamble than an exchange. The potential risk 
confound has been discussed in Karlan (2005) and examined in Schechter (2004). Of course such a 
correlation is not too surprising, but it does suggest that insuring against risk might be as 
effective as building trust. 
5  There are fewer observations in the unemployment graph because this information is not 
reported for Tanzania or Uganda. 
6 Of course the sort of farmers markets that the Henrich et al. participants are used to are vastly 
different than the thick anonymous markets common in developed economies. It is not obvious 
that the effect of market integration is globally monotonic, especially controlling for the size of 
the market. 
7 Gowdy et al., (2003) and Bahry and Wilson (2003) draw similar conclusions.
8 More recently this fable has been discussed in Lawrance (1991), Moseley (2001), Neilsen (2001), 
and Ogaki and Atkeson (1977).
9  We point out, but do not discuss, two other studies that do not fit neatly into our two 
categories of risk experiments. Barr and Packard (2000) adopt the Schubert et al., (1999) method 
for measuring the certainty equivalents of Chilean adults to determine if the self-employed are 
less risk averse. Schechter (2005) has people in rural Paraguay bet on the roll of a die to test their 
attitudes towards risk. Perhaps because the protocol is sufficiently different, Schechter finds 
rather high levels of risk aversion (the average CRRA was 2.57). 
10 However, there appear to be a number of issues with Neilsen’s experiment. One problem is that 
the lowest IDR interval is between 0 and 20%. Another problem is that the intervals are so wide 
that little precision can be expected. 
11 See Roth et al., (1991), Harrison and List (2004) and Carpenter et al., (2005b). 
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